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 TRACK: Entrepreneurship and Small Business 
UNDERSTANDING HOW TIMING OF ALLIANCE FORMATION AFFECTS NEW-
VENTURE SURVIVAL: THE DYNAMICS OF TEMPORAL CONGRUENCE AND 
CONTINGENCY 
David M. Gomulya, University of Washington, dgomulya@u.washington.edu 
 
ABSTRACT 
New-venture survival has greatly interested many scholars. While alliances have been 
shown to increase survival, the literature remains silent regarding the effect of timing of alliance 
formations. Related literatures regarding timing of other types of actions have also been unable 
to theoretically explain their conflicting empirical findings, which suggest that the effect of 
timing can range from positive to negative. To fill critical theoretical gaps, I develop a novel 
model based on temporal changes during the pre- and post-formation phases of an alliance. I 
show the effect can indeed range from positive to negative. I delineate further boundary 
condition.  
 
INTRODUCTION AND LITERATURE REVIEW 
―Timing is everything‖ – 
Greg Gottesman & Matt McIlwain, Managing Directors, Madrona Venture Group 
 How does the timing of alliance formations (i.e. forming alliances earlier or later in 
time) affect new-venture survival? New-venture survival has been a topic of interest for many 
scholars. To survive, new ventures need to overcome their lack of resources, information, and 
legitimacy. As interorganizational relationships helps new ventures acquire those critical means 
of survival from other organizations, forming such relationships then becomes especially 
important for new-venture survival (Aldrich & Fiol, 1994; Delmar & Shane, 2004; Singh, 
Tucker, & House, 1986; Stuart, Hoang, & Hybels, 1999; Suchman, 1995).
 
An alliance is a type 
of interorganizational relationship that new ventures frequently form with other organizations. 
An alliance is defined as a relationship formed between two or more independent organizations 
that involves exchanging, sharing, or co-developing resources and capabilities to achieve mutual 
benefits (Gulati, 1995; Kale & Singh, 2009). The literature has examined how alliances increase 
new-venture survival (e.g. Baum, Calabrese & Silverman, 2000; Baum & Oliver, 1991; Hoang & 
Antoncic, 2003; Raz & Gloor, 2007)
.
 However, the literature is relatively silent regarding how 
the timing of alliance formation (i.e. forming alliances earlier or later in time) can affect new-
venture survival. This is despite the fact that the literature has highlighted that the issue of timing 
is critical (Gulati & Higgins, 2003; Hoang & Antoncic, 2003; Lavie, Lechner, & Singh, 2007). 
"Unfortunately, the alliance literature has largely overlooked the implications of timing" (Lavie 
et al., 2007: 583), which resonates with anecdotal evidences suggesting how some founders and 
venture capitalists claim that timing is important, if not ―everything‖. 
To the best of my knowledge, the only study regarding the consequences of timing of 
alliance formations on performance is the work by Lavie et al. (2007)
1
. In other words, the 
question of timing of alliance formation has practically been ignored. Based on the first-mover-
advantage (FMA) theory, Lavie et al. (2007) argue that forming alliances earlier increases 
performance because being the first to enter a market should lead to positive economic profits. 
                                                          
1
 Although, a few studies have examined the antecedence behind the timing of relationship formation. 
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This is because moving first should allow firms to develop technology earlier, secure scarce 
resources, and prevent buyers from switching to competitors (Lieberman & Montgomery, 1988).  
While the FMA theory fits well the context of Lavie et al (2007), which investigates 
firms‘ entry into a multipartner alliance in the Wi-Fi industry, in general alliance formation is 
different from market entry. More importantly, as of now, the FMA theory still faces challenges 
in explaining the conflicting empirical findings regarding the existence of such an advantage. 
Suarez and Lanzolla (2007) summarize that after many empirical studies, findings show that the 
relationship between order of entry and performance seems to range from positive to negative, 
including no relationship. Hence, FMA scholars themselves believe that their understanding can 
still benefit from further theorizations (Suarez & Lanzolla, 2007).  
Furthermore, the related literature regarding decision speed of new ventures (Bourgeois 
& Eisenhardt, 1988; Eisenhardt, 1989) is not very well suited to answer the timing question 
either; new ventures can make the same decision with the same speed (e.g. 1 month) but at 
different timings (e.g. this year versus next year). More importantly, empirical studies in that 
literature have also resulted in conflicting findings.  Studies have found that the relationship 
between decision-speed and performance can range from positive (e.g. Baum & Wally, 2003; 
Judge & Miller, 1991) to negative (e.g. Perlow, Okhuysen, & Repenning, 2002), including no 
relationship (e.g. Judge & Miller, 1991).  
My research question is: How does the timing of alliance formations (i.e. forming 
alliances earlier or later in time) affect new-venture survival? While this question differs from 
that asked in the FMA and decision-speed literatures, this study indeed benefits from those 
literatures, and may enrich other literatures, including those two.  
 
THEORY 
Understanding the effect of timing of alliance formations is challenging because the 
relationship involves many ―moving parts‖, non-linear changes, and random elements. Following 
the literature (Ancona, Goodman, Lawrence, & Tushman, 2001; Davis, Eisenhardt, & Bingham, 
2007; Gulati & Puranam, 2009), I use simple mathematical representations to aid my 
theorizations. Furthermore, to enable better analysis and exposition, the literature has 
recommended that the analysis be divided into static and dynamic components (Gulati & 
Puranam, 2009). During the static analysis, the task is to explain the causal relationships among 
the variables without involving any temporal element. After the static relationships become clear, 
the temporal elements can then be introduced in the following dynamic analysis. The ultimate 
goal is to integrate both analyses to reveal the causal relationship between timing of alliance 
formation and new-venture survival.  
However, to help guide through the rest of this paper, the main gist behind my 
theorizations is the following. First, forming an alliance later/earlier will allow new ventures to 
accumulate a higher/lower level of knowledge, which helps planning in the pre-formation phase. 
Second, however as new ventures forms an alliance later/earlier, new ventures may encounter 
different macro environments in the post-formation phase. Different macro environments can 
yield different outcomes for that alliance, and thus affect new ventures‘ survival differently. As a 
result, the effect of timing of alliance formation on new-venture survival jointly depends on how 
new ventures‘ knowledge and the macro environment change with time during the pre- and post-
formation phases of that alliance (Figure 1).  
________________________________________________________________________ 
2011 Proceedings of the Southwest Academy of Management 
  Houston, TX, March 9 – 11, 2011 
9 
 
Static Analysis 
Planning during pre-formation phase as a congruence process. Like any other actions, 
the effect of alliance formation on new-venture survival depends on how the alliance is planned 
during its pre-formation phase. Given new ventures‘ strategy, new ventures can decide to form 
various alliances to carry out their strategy. For each alliance, new ventures strive to come up 
with a plan that can increase the expected outcome of that alliance. To produce such a plan, new 
ventures may need to undertake various planning activities during the pre-formation phase of an 
alliance, such as selecting an appropriate partner, or setting up appropriate governance to oversee 
the alliance (Gulati, 1998; Kale & Singh, 2009). However, an alliance could produce several 
potential outcomes, depending upon the scenario with which the alliance unfolds. These potential 
outcomes can range from the most preferred outcome to the least preferred. Similar to other 
planning process, the planning of an alliance can help new ventures identify various potential 
outcomes that may result from that alliance, and select a path of action likely leads to the most 
preferred outcome (Bhide, 2000; Delmar & Shane, 2003; Gulati, 1998; Mintzberg, 1994).  
 
FIGURE 1 
Pre- and Post-formation Phases, and Timing of Alliance Formation 
 
 
 
 
 
For example, for a new venture that produces payment software, the broad objective of a 
technical alliance is to create web-based payment software. Given that objective, the most 
preferred outcome is web-based payment software that can generate a net income of a certain 
amount, let‘s say, $ 1 million. The least preferred outcome is a complete waste of resources. As 
each potential outcome may occur, it then becomes associated with a certain probability. For 
example, that most preferred outcome hypothetically has a 20% probability of occurring, while 
State of Macro 
Environment 
Time 
Pre-formation Post-formation 
Timing of alliance formation 
Macro Environment 
(Industry demand) 
Forming an alliance later/earlier will: 
- Allow new ventures to accumulate more/less knowledge during the pre-formation 
phase. 
-  But, new ventures may encounter different macro environments during the post-
formation phase. 
Thus, the effect of forming an alliance later/earlier jointly depends on how new ventures’ 
knowledge and the macro environment change with time. 
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the least preferred outcome a 10% probability. The expected outcome of that alliance then 
becomes the sum of the probability of each potential outcome occurring multiplied by the value 
of each potential outcome (March, 1994: Ch. 1).  
Of course, as any prediction about the future is fraught with errors, new ventures cannot 
be certain in advance with both the probability and the value of each potential outcome. 
Nonetheless, despite the presence of uncertainty (Knight, 1921; McMullen & Shepherd, 2006), 
with planning new ventures strive to identify various potential outcomes that may result from an 
alliance, and select a path that likely leads to the most preferred outcome (Bhide, 2000; Delmar 
& Shane, 2003; Gulati, 1998; Kale & Singh, 2009; Mintzberg, 1994). In that way, planning helps 
improve the outcome of an alliance (Gulati, 1998; Kale & Singh, 2009), and increases new 
ventures‘ performance (Bhide, 2000; Delmar & Shane, 2003). To highlight this, planning can be 
conceptualized as a process whose purpose is to select a path of action that is more likely to be in 
congruent with new ventures‘ objective of increasing performance, or a congruence process. 
Furthermore, studies on decision-speed literature (Bourgeois & Eisenhardt, 1988; 
Eisenhardt, 1989; Perlow et al., 2002) suggests that new ventures‘ ability to make a better 
decision and take a more favorable action is influenced by the knowledge they possess at the 
time the decision is made. Intuitively, new ventures‘ ability to select a path that increases their 
probability of achieving the most preferred outcome should also be related to the level of 
knowledge that they have
2
.  
Following the previous example, given the objective of the technical alliance is to create 
web-based payment software, knowledge can help new ventures increase the probability of 
achieving the most preferred outcome, for instance, through identifying the right partner with a 
relevant experience, assembling a better team, understanding the appropriate technology to use, 
or designing a better incentive system to encourage the best efforts by all parties. Through any 
possible combinations of means, the knowledge that new ventures have when planning helps 
new ventures select a path that most likely leads to the successful fulfillment of the objective of 
an alliance. This way, such knowledge helps new ventures increase the expected outcome of that 
alliance, and, consequently, their survival. 
The importance of striving to follow a better path during planning increases because the 
impact of such path continues after an alliance is formed (Arthur, 1989; David, 1985; Mintzberg, 
1994). For example, after a new venture completes the planning of an alliance, that new venture 
needs to sign a binding agreement with its alliance partner. Consequently, during the 
implementation of that alliance, that new venture will find it harder to break away from that 
relationship, if such a need arises. The sunk cost that new ventures have incurred during planning 
can also lead to an escalation of commitment that reduces new ventures‘ subsequent choices in 
the post-formation phase. Even when no contractual agreement is involved, a planning process 
can cause new ventures to be emotionally and cognitively invested to follow a certain path. For 
example, by spending a lot of time planning for an alliance, a new venture might become 
invested to proceed with that alliance, despite the lack of any contractual agreement. Overall, the 
path new ventures decide to follow during planning can constrain the subsequent choices new 
ventures can take in the post-formation phase (Arthur, 1989; David, 1985; Mintzberg, 1994).  
Implementation during post-formation phase as a contingency process. However, even 
though planning can steer new ventures to follow a path that increases their probability of 
                                                          
2
 Following Kogut and Zander (1992), I define knowledge as consisting of information, e.g. facts, and know-how, 
e.g. ability to execute something smoothly and effectively. 
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achieving the most preferred outcome, many contingent factors related to implementation can 
cause the actual outcome at the end of that path to differ from that expected during planning. 
Using the previous example, a new venture follows the path that has a 20% probability of 
creating web-based payment software that can generate a net income of $ 1 million. However, an 
unexpected collapse in the market causes the demand for all technical products to slump. As a 
result, that technical alliance generates no net income. In that instance, the new venture is still 
following the same path. However, the outcome at the end of the path has now changed 
substantially. With that, the effect of that alliance on the new venture‘s survival changes as well. 
While I recognize that many contingencies can affect the outcome during the post-
formation phase, here I only focus on the macro environment as a contingency (I also define 
macro environment as the strength of market demand in a given industry). This is because 
numerous studies have shown how the macro environment bounds and exerts a top-down 
influence on the effects of lower level factors (e.g. Agarwal, Sarkar, & Echambadi, 2002; 
Bourgeois & Eisenhardt, 1988; Suarez and Lanzolla, 2007). This top-down effect causes the 
contingent effect of the macro environment to override the contingent effects of other more 
micro factors (Catrogiovanni, 1991). As a result, the actual outcome from the implementation of 
an alliance in the post-formation phase is contingent upon the macro environment. To highlight 
this, the implementation of an alliance in the post-formation phase can be conceptualized as a 
process whose outcome depends on various contingencies, most importantly the macro 
environment, or a contingency process. 
To summarize, in this static-analysis section I have highlighted how the effect of 
alliances on new-venture survival depends on which path is selected during planning in the pre-
formation phase, and the changes in the macro environment during implementation in the post-
formation phase. Having a higher level of knowledge during planning increases new ventures‘ 
probability of selecting a path that leads to the most preferred outcome. While that path 
constrains new ventures‘ subsequent actions, the actual outcome from those actions depends on 
the macro environment. Figure 2 depicts how knowledge influences the probability of an alliance 
to proceed along a certain path, and how each path is associated with a certain outcome. Figure 2 
also highlights the role of the macro environment as an important contingency in affecting the 
outcome of an alliance. Figure 3 further details how having more knowledge at the pre-formation 
phase favorably increases the probability distribution associated with the various paths.  
 
FIGURE 2 
New Venture’s Decision Making Process 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 3 
Knowledge during Pre-formation Phase and the Probability of Selecting the Most 
Preferred Outcome 
Survival 
* K = Knowledge during planning 
… 
Effect of 
alliance 
formed 
Pri1(K*) 
Prin(K) 
Pri2(K) 
Most preferred outcomei (the macro 
environment) 
2nd most preferred outcomei (the macro 
environment) 
Least preferred outcomei (the macro environment) 
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Dynamic Analysis 
The difference between the static and dynamic analyses is that the latter now incorporates 
temporal components. During this dynamic analysis, I answer the research question of this paper. 
That is, how timing of alliance formation (i.e. forming alliances earlier or later in time) affects 
new-venture survival. I do so by building upon the previous static analysis. Specifically, I further 
elaborate on how knowledge and the macro environment changes with time, and how their 
effects then depend on when an alliance is formed.   
To help identify the effect of timing of alliance formation on new-venture survival, I 
partially differentiate the new-venture-survival variable with respect to the timing-of-alliance-
formation variable. I then group the results into two parts. These two parts reflect the effects of 
timing of alliance formation that arises from the pre- and post-formation phases. To understand 
the overall effect of timing of alliance formation on new-venture survival, both effects have to be 
summed up. To illustrate, the static and dynamic analyses can be simply expressed as the 
following equations (please see the Appendix for details). Due to the inclusion of the temporal 
components, planning can now be better conceptualized as a temporal-congruence process, while 
implementation as a temporal-contingency process. I label the dynamic model as the Temporal-
Congruence-and-Contingency (TCC) model. 
Static analysis:  
New-venture survival = Effect from congruence process during planning, a function of 
knowledge + Effect from contingency process during implementation, a function of the 
macro environment 
Dynamic analysis:  
 Effect from temporal-congruence process during 
planning, a function of how knowledge changes with the timing of alliance formation + 
Effect from temporal-contingency process during implementation, a function of how 
macro environment changes with the timing of alliance formation. 
However, before I offer a proposition regarding the overall effect of timing of alliance 
formation, I first offer propositions regarding the effect of such timing that results from each of 
the pre- and post-formation phases, starting with the former. As usual, the propositions provide 
opportunities for future empirical validations. However, more importantly, the propositions help 
unpack the overall relationship between timing of alliance formation and new-venture survival.  
More knowledge 
Least preferred Most 
preferred 
Outcome 
Probability 
Less knowledge 
Least preferred Most preferred 
Outcome 
Probability 
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Planning during pre-formation phase as a temporal-congruence process. Even when 
analyzed from a dynamic perspective, new ventures still strive to come up with a plan that can 
increase the expected outcome of an alliance. In this regard, there is no difference between the 
static and dynamic analysis. However, in reality, planning can be concluded earlier or later. As 
new ventures wait longer to finalize a plan for an alliance, new ventures‘ knowledge likely 
changes. For example, new ventures become more knowledgeable about what it takes to form a 
successful alliance. Those changes can then affect the outcome from planning. Accordingly, the 
timing of when new ventures end planning can influence the outcome from planning.  
As explained earlier, the critical variable during planning is the knowledge that new 
ventures have. From a temporal perspective, such knowledge likely accumulates over time. This 
stems especially from the fact that new ventures often start with limited knowledge 
(Stinchcombe, 1965)
3
. In the static analysis, I have explained how knowledge can help new 
ventures make better decisions. This in turn helps new ventures survive. The same explanation 
still holds in this dynamic analysis. However, as new ventures‘ knowledge likely increases over 
time, new ventures‘ ability to select better alliances should also increase accordingly over time. 
Consequently, new-venture survival should increase as new ventures form alliances later and 
acquire more knowledge. This is the essence of planning as a temporal-congruence process.  
Empirical findings about how firms that act later excel in product quality (Bohlmann, 
Golder, & Mitra, 2002; Shamsie, Phelps, & Kuperman, 2004) or incorporate the newest 
technology (Dowell & Swaminathan, 2006) support this argument. Those studies show how 
taking action later enables firms to design better products or select a better technology, which 
increases their performance. The following proposition describes the essence of planning as a 
temporal-congruence process (please see the appendix for proof).  
Proposition 1. Because new ventures likely accumulate more knowledge over time, which 
helps planning, forming alliances later has a positive effect on new-venture survival
4
.  
 
However, different new ventures accumulate their knowledge at different rates, and this 
heterogeneity could be critical. Studies on the speed of decision process show how different 
managers acquire different amount of knowledge within the same amount of time by using 
different approaches to acquire it (Bourgeois & Eisenhardt, 1988; Eisenhardt, 1989). Managers 
with an ability to acquire knowledge at a higher rate perform significantly better (Bourgeois & 
Eisenhardt, 1988; Eisenhardt, 1989). Using a completely different approach (NKC-simulation), 
Ganco and Agarwal (2009) show how new ventures that acquire knowledge at a higher rate can 
outperform even more established firms. These studies (Bourgeois & Eisenhardt, 1988; 
Eisenhardt, 1989; Ganco & Agarwal, 2009) support the insight generated from analyzing 
planning as a temporal-congruence process.  
New ventures with a higher rate of knowledge growth can accumulate more knowledge 
within a given amount of time than those with a lower rate. As knowledge facilitates planning, 
which helps increase survival, new ventures that have more knowledge during planning should 
also have a higher probability of survival. This way, new ventures‘ ability to accumulate 
knowledge at a higher rate will enhance, or positively moderate, the benefits they receive from 
delaying the formation of an alliance by a given amount of time. For example, new venture A 
                                                          
3
 To remove unnecessary confusion, I distinguish the term level or the value of a variable at a point in time from 
the term rate or how a variable changes values or levels over a period of time. 
4
 This is provided that the window of opportunity to form those alliances is still open (Tyre & Orlikowski, 1994). 
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can acquire knowledge twice as much as new venture B within, let‘s say, a month. Let us assume 
that in a month, new venture A is able to acquire information regarding its competitors and 
customers; whereas new venture B can only acquire information regarding its competitors. In 
that case, the ability of new venture A to accumulate knowledge at a higher rate will allow it to 
make a better decision at the end of the month. That way, the ability of new venture A to 
accumulate knowledge at a higher rate enhances the benefit it receives from delaying its alliance 
formation by a month
5
 (please see the appendix for proof). 
Proposition 2. The rate with which new ventures accumulate knowledge positively 
moderates the effect of forming alliances later on new-venture survival. 
 
Implementation during post-formation phase as a temporal-contingency process. From 
a dynamic perspective, two temporal components affect the implementation process, and its 
corresponding outcome. They are timing of alliance formation, and the length of period over 
which the performance of an alliance is observed (I elaborate later on why the effect of the 
length of observation period needs to be considered). Next, I explain the effect of each temporal 
component, starting from the effect of timing of alliance formation. 
Timing of alliance formation can significantly affect the outcome during the post-
formation phase through the following process. Different macro environments likely yield 
different outcomes, as discussed during the previous static analysis. However, the macro 
environment likely changes over time. As such, alliances formed at different time periods likely 
encounter different macro environments. Consequently, alliances formed at different time 
periods likely yield different outcomes. This way, timing of alliance formation can significantly 
affect implementation outcome.  
While the change in the macro environment over time can take all kinds of shapes, three 
different scenarios presented in Figure 5 indicate how the effect of timing of alliance formation 
can range from positive to negative, depending upon the macro environment. In case 1, the 
macro environment becomes more favorable over time in a non-linear manner. In that case, if 
new ventures form an alliance at ta1, and assuming that the outcome (net income from that 
alliance) increases in the same manner as the macro environment, then the outcome of that 
alliance will increase by A over the observation period ∆t. However, if the alliance is formed at 
ta2, the increase is B, which is bigger. In this case, delaying the alliance formation 
 
 
FIGURE 4 
Relationship among Rate of Knowledge Accumulation, Outcome and Timing of Alliance 
Formation 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
5
 This is provided that the window of opportunity to form those alliances is still open (Tyre & Orlikowski, 1994). 
OutcomeA 
OutcomeB 
Proposition 2 
 
                 
Outcome 
Time 
B 
ta 
A 
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from ta1 to ta2 allows new ventures to earn a higher outcome (i.e. B and not A). In case 2, 
where the macro environment becomes more favorable before reaching its peak and starting to 
decline, forming alliance at ta2 instead of ta1 costs new ventures a loss (-B) instead of a gain (A). 
In case 3, where the macro environment becomes more favorable but in a stable manner, new 
ventures neither gain nor lose anything by taking actions at ta2 instead of ta1. This is due to a 
subtle, but critical, difference between time (clock time) and timing of alliance formation (event 
time) (Ancona, Okhuysen, & Perlow, 2001). While outcome increases with time (clock time), 
outcome does not change with timing of alliance formation (event time).  
These examples demonstrate the following points. First, the effect of timing of alliance 
formation on the outcome from implementation during the post-formation phase is contingent 
upon the macro environment. Second, the effect can be positive, negative, or even none (please 
see the Appendix for further proof). All considered, during implementation, the macro 
environment is an important contingency that influences how timing of alliance formation can 
affect new-venture survival. The following proposition describes that contingent effect.  
Proposition 3. Depending upon the changes in the macro environment during 
implementation, the effect of forming alliances later on new-venture survival can range 
from positive to negative. 
 
Earlier, I indicated that the effect of the length of period over which the performance of 
an alliance is observed (or the length of observation period) needs to be considered. Two reasons 
explain this argument. First, it is because performance is a cumulative, not a snapshot, measure. 
Hence, performance has to be observed over a period of time. Second, understanding the effect 
of such length also becomes necessary because that effect can be related to the effect of timing of 
alliance formation under certain scenarios. Assuming that observation is truncated after a certain 
point, a common empirical practice, new ventures that form alliances earlier/later will experience 
a longer/shorter observation period. Thus, understanding the effect of length of observation 
period complements our understanding regarding the effect of timing of alliance formation. 
The length of observation period can affect implementation outcome through the 
following process. As the macro environment changes over time, changing the length of 
observation period allows different macro environments to influence the implementation process. 
As the macro environment can change the outcome from implementation, changing the length of 
the observation period can also change the outcome from implementation. Figure 6 illustrates 
this point. Consequently, the effect of changing the length of the observation period can range 
from positive to negative depending upon the macro environment (please see the Appendix for 
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proof). This means that another temporal-contingency effect that depends on the length of the 
observation period emerges.  
Proposition 4. Depending upon the changes in the macro environment during 
implementation, the effect of increasing the length of observation period on new-venture 
survival can range from positive to negative. 
 
Overall effect of timing of alliance formation. So far, I have explained how the effects of timing 
of alliance formation on new-venture survival depend not only on what goes on during planning 
in the pre-formation phase, but also that during implementation in the post-formation phase. 
However, as I indicated throughout this paper, to understand the overall effect of timing of 
alliance formation, its effects from both phases have to be summed up. While the effect from 
planning is positive (Proposition 1), the effect from implementation can range from positive to 
negative, depending upon the macro environment (Proposition 3 and 4).  Under certain macro 
environments, it thus becomes possible that the effects from both temporal processes are both 
positive. In this case, the planning and implementation processes yield synergistic effects (i.e., 
both positive effects). However, under other macro environments, the effects from both 
processes may differ. In that case, the planning and implementation processes yield non-
synergistic effects (i.e., positive and non-positive effects). In that case, it also becomes possible 
that timing of alliance formation has no effect on new-venture survival (i.e. overall zero effect). 
The following proposition simply sums up the effects from Proposition 1, 3 and 4.  
Proposition 5. The overall effect of forming alliances later on new-venture survival is the sum of 
its effects from temporal changes during planning and implementation. That overall effect can 
range from positive to negative, depending upon changes in new ventures’ knowledge and the 
macro environment over time. 
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FIGURE 5 
Change in Performance Outcome When the Timing of Alliance Formation Changes 
6
 
                                                          
6
 These are only some possible scenarios, and not exhaustive. ta1 and ta2 refer to different timings of alliance formations, i.e. timing 1 and timing 2; ∆t refers 
to the length of observation period. All cases refer to changes in performance corresponding to changes in the macro environment. 
 
∆ta 
                            
Outcome 
Time 
∆t ∆t 
A 
-B 
ta1 ta
2 
Case 2: Forming alliances later 
decreases outcome 
 
∆ta 
                 
Outcome 
Time 
∆t ∆t 
A 
B 
ta1 ta2 
Case 1: Forming alliances 
later increases outcome 
 
∆ta 
                    
Outcome 
Time 
∆t ∆t 
A 
B 
ta1 ta
2 
Case 3: Forming alliances later 
does not change outcome 
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FIGURE 6 
Change in Performance Outcome When the Length of Observation Period Changes 
7
 
                                                          
7
 These are only some possible scenarios, and not exhaustive. ta refers to timing of alliance formation; ∆t1 and ∆t2 refer to different lengths of observation 
period. All cases refer to changes in performance corresponding to changes in the macro environment. 
 
∆(∆t) 
                    
Outcome 
Time 
∆t1 
∆t2 
A 
B 
ta 
Case 3: Increasing observation 
period increases outcome 
 
∆(∆t) 
                            
Outcome 
Time 
∆t1 
∆t2 
A 
B 
ta 
Case 2: Increasing observation 
period decreases outcome 
 
∆(∆t) 
                 
Outcome 
Time 
∆t1 
∆t2 
A 
B 
ta 
Case 1: Increasing 
observation period increases 
outcome 
________________________________________________________________________ 
2011 Proceedings of the Southwest Academy of Management 
  Houston, TX, March 9 – 11, 2011 
19 
 
Increasing and decreasing macro-environmental munificence. The presence of a 
temporal-contingency process means that finer propositions need to be based on a specific 
context. One interesting context for new ventures will be survival under an increasing or a 
decreasing level of resources in the macro environment, or macro-environmental munificence 
(Catrogiovanni, 1991). Given the importance of resources for new-venture survival 
(Stinchcombe, 1965), the changing level of macro-environmental munificence can influence the 
effect of timing of alliance formation on new-venture survival. For example, while rushing in 
might cost new ventures their better judgment, doing so might make more sense under a certain 
context. The question is then whether new ventures should form an alliance earlier or later under 
an increasing or a decreasing macro-environmental munificence. 
From the planning process, forming an alliance later allows new ventures to accumulate 
more knowledge, and hence increases their survival, regardless of whether the macro-
environmental munificence is increasing or decreasing. However, from the implementation 
process, the relationship between the timing of alliance formation and new-venture survival is 
likely to be contingent upon the changing macro-environmental munificence.  
When the macro-environmental munificence decreases and the industry demand 
weakens, investing in an alliance more likely yields a negative than a positive outcome. If that is 
the case, forming an alliance earlier likely causes new ventures to suffer from more negative 
outcome. New ventures may spend their valuable resources without seeing any return for a 
longer period of time. Having less resource, new ventures would then have reduced flexibility to 
take advantage of more attractive opportunities. The decreasing level of resources in the 
environment will also provide fewer opportunities to recover from any mistakes. Consequently, 
from the implementation process, new ventures should form an alliance later in order to increase 
survival. As a result, under a decreasing macro-environmental munificence, the planning and 
implementation processes yield a synergistic relationship. That is, both processes suggest that 
forming an alliance later should increase new-venture survival. 
On the contrary, when the macro-environmental munificence increases and the industry 
demand strengthens, the reverse happens. As a result, from the implementation process, new 
ventures should form an alliance earlier in order to increase survival. However, as the planning 
process suggests that new ventures should form an alliance later, a trade-off arises. All 
considered, I argue that the effect from the implementation process will outweigh the effect from 
the planning process. On the one hand, if the alliances that new ventures form early are fraught 
with mistakes due to, let‘s say, a rather premature plan, the effect should not be fatal. This is 
because as the market continues to grow, new ventures should still have opportunities to acquire 
new resources from their stakeholders or the market. Given such slack, new ventures should be 
able to afford forming an alliance based on a rather premature plan. On the other hand, if those 
alliances turn out to be successful despite the shorter planning time, new ventures can reap the 
benefits of those alliances earlier. Overall, I propose that when macro-environmental 
munificence increases, forming an alliance earlier should increase survival (Table 1).  
Proposition 6. Under increasing/decreasing macro-environmental munificence, the 
overall relationship between forming alliances later and new-venture survival is 
negative/positive. 
 
TABLE 1 
Effect of Forming Alliances Later on New-Venture Survival 
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 Under increasing macro-
environmental munificence 
Under decreasing macro-
environmental munificence 
Effect from temporal-
congruence process 
Positive Positive 
Effect from temporal-
contingency process 
Negative Positive 
Total effects Negative Positive 
 
 
DISCUSSION 
This study examines the question of how to increase new-venture survival from a 
relatively new lens – the temporal lens (Ancona et al., 2001). In specific, this study asks how 
timing of alliance formation affects new-venture survival. Given the dynamics and complexity of 
such timing question, I developed my conceptual theorizations with the aid of a simple 
mathematical model. The resulting theorization shows how the effect of timing of alliance 
formation on new-venture survival jointly depends on how knowledge accumulates while an 
alliance is planned in its pre-formation phase, and how the macro environment changes in the 
post-formation phase of an alliance. Depending upon the rate of knowledge accumulation and the 
changes in the macro environment, the overall effect of timing of alliance formation can then 
range from positive to negative. I then hypothesize that under increasing/decreasing 
environmental munificence, forming an alliance earlier/later increases new-venture survival.  
 The conceptual theorizations developed here conform to various empirical findings found 
in other temporally focused literatures. For example, the fact that the effect of the timing of 
alliance formation can range from positive to negative can potentially explain the seemingly 
conflicting findings found in the first-mover advantage literature. As Suarez and Lanzolla (2007) 
highlighted, important contingencies, especially the macro environment, may play a large role in 
generating the seemingly conflicting findings. By looking at the macro environment, this paper 
strongly supports the argument put forward by Suarez and Lanzolla (2007).   
 Similarly, the conceptual theorizations developed here can potentially explain the 
seemingly conflicting findings found in the decision speed literature. One potential reason 
behind this conflicting finding is the fact that effect of decision speed on performance is closely 
intertwined with the timing at which the decision is made. As the dual temporal congruence and 
temporal contingency processes suggest, what matters is not only how fast the decision is made, 
but also when the decision is made. Decisions made under different timings may face different 
macro environments, and hence may yield different outcomes. By incorporating the effect of the 
macro environment, the relationship between decision speed and performance can now range 
from positive to negative, just like what the empirical findings suggest.   
Likewise, the conceptual theorizations developed here also supports the empirical 
findings by Lavie et al. (2007). While the study by Lavie et al., (2007) investigates a 
multipartner-alliance context, the macro environment for that study increases in munificence, as 
evidenced by the increasing demand for Wi-Fi products and the increasing number of 
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participants in that multipartner alliance. In that increasingly munificent macro environment, 
their finding shows that entering the multipartner alliance earlier increases performance, just like 
what the temporal-congruence-and-contingency model predicted here.  
Contributions 
 Building upon established foundations regarding the importance of knowledge and the 
macro environment, this study helps connect seemingly disparate streams of literature into a 
broader, more closely related picture. To the entrepreneurship and the alliance literatures, this 
study provides a new perspective in our pursuit of trying to understand what can increase new-
venture survival. By investigating how timing of alliance formation can increase new-venture 
survival, this study not only reaffirms the importance of alliances, but also explains how the 
timing of alliances can accentuate or attenuate their benefits, and hence affect survival. While 
finding the right partner is important, finding the right time to pick the right partner could be as 
important, if not more. Given the appropriate amount of time to accumulate knowledge about 
one‘s potential partner, a new venture can potentially increase its probability of selecting the 
right partner. In that sense, new ventures‘ ability to pick the right partner can be a function of 
new ventures‘ ability to pick the right time to form that alliance. Furthermore, as new ventures 
usually form alliances rather frequently, the issue of timing of alliance formation should 
frequently surface. As such, this paper can have a rather significant implication for practice.  
 To the first-mover advantage literature, this paper suggests the important of not rushing 
in. In fact, what is more certain from the theorizations here is that waiting longer to form an 
alliance allows new ventures to accumulate more knowledge and form better alliances.  In other 
words, the temporal congruence process highlights the advantage of taking actions later. Put 
differently, the temporal congruence process highlights that first mover disadvantages potentially 
exist, a point suggested by Lieberman & Montgomery (1998) and is consistent with various 
empirical findings suggesting that late movers can actually perform better than earlier movers 
(Bohlmann et al., 2002; Dowell & Swaminathan, 2006; Shamsie et al., 2004). This 
counterintuitive argument can be important as the inclination to move first can be so impulsive. 
Furthermore, the temporal congruence-and-contingency model demonstrates that timing 
matters in both absolute and relative sense. Being the first to move is a relative definition. 
However, timing is also essential when viewed based upon a fixed and common reference point 
in time, or in an absolute sense. At different points in time, the conditions of the macro 
environments differ. As the macro environment could affect the outcome of an action, where an 
action is located along the temporal axis – and not just relative to the first mover- could be 
critically important. In this sense, this study further highlights the role of macro environments in 
understanding the effect of timing. 
Some areas for future studies include testing the propositions here and exploring other 
macro environmental conditions, e.g. uncertain market environments. Also, understanding how 
various decision-making strategies, e.g. incremental resource allocations (Adner & Levinthal, 
2004; McGrath, 1997; McGrath, Ferrier, & Mendelow, 2004) can influence the timing of 
alliance formation could be an interesting avenue for future study. To conclude, timing is an 
almost inescapable part of every decision new ventures have to make. Anecdotal evidences even 
suggest that some entrepreneurs and investors swear that timing is everything. However, our 
extant understanding regarding how time and timing can affect new-venture performance 
remains relatively limited. Expanding this understanding could potentially result in not only an 
exciting and prolific stream of research, but also relevant, practical recommendations to new 
ventures. 
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APPENDIX 
Static Model 
An alliance can have multiple outcomes, ranging from the most preferred to the least preferred, with 
each having a certain probability of being realized. Let ‘Best’ be the most preferred outcome and ‘Worst’ 
be the least preferred outcome. Let the probability of each outcome be labeled from Pr(1) to Pr(n) 
starting from the most preferred to the least preferred outcome, respectively. 
 
Performance of an alliance = Pr(1).Best + Pr(2). Outcome 2 + … + Pr(n).Worst - (1) 
 
To simplify the mathematical model, equation (1) can be represented by only the most and least 
preferred outcomes. To do so, let Pr(Best) and Pr(Worst) be another set of probabilities. 
  
Pr(1).Best + Pr(2). Outcome 2 + … + Pr(n).Worst = Pr(Best).Best + Pr(Worst).Worst – (2) 
         where Pr(Best) + Pr(Worst) = 1 or Pr(Worst) = 1-Pr(Best), such that 
Pr(Best) =  *(Pr(1).Best + Pr(2). Outcome 2 + … + Pr(n).Worst) – Worst]/(Best – Worst) – (3) 
 
Furthermore, to differentiate the effect of various alliances, let the subscript “i” represents the 
characteristics of an alliance “i”, while “Envi” represents the characteristics of the macro environment 
associated with an alliance “i”. The performance of an alliance can then be represented by equation (4). 
  
Performance of an alliance = Pri(Best).Besti(Envi) + Pri(Worst).Worsti(Envi)  – (4) 
 
Dynamic Model 
 
So far, the variables have been treated as time-invariant. However, the actual outcome of an alliance 
may change depending upon the macro environment, which may change with time. As such, alliances 
formed at different time (ta) may have different outcome. Further, as the effect of an alliance 
accumulates over time, that outcome also depends on how long the performance of an alliance is 
observed (∆t). Including these temporal factors, equation (4) becomes the following. (For conciseness, 
let variable “P” be an abbreviation for cumulative performance from time ta to time  
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- (5) 
 
However, the probability of achieving the most or least preferred outcome depends on the cumulative 
knowledge (K) that new ventures have at the time the alliance is formed (ta), and a random error (ε), 
which is not a function of timing of alliance formation. As a higher level of knowledge helps new 
ventures increase their probability of achieving the most preferred outcome, I have the following 
relationship. 
 
 Pri(Best) = K(ta) + ε – (6) 
 
As any probability ranges from 0.0 to 1.0, K(ta) is standardized from 0.0 to 1.0. Replacing Pri(Best) with 
(K(ta) + ε) gives the following
ε. WorstiEnvi( , +Δ )  – (7) 
 
To shorten notations, let K be the short form for ,  for , and  
for . As ε is not a function of ,  = 0. Partially differentiating performance 
(P) with respect to timing of alliance formation ta using the product rule will allow me to observe the 
effect of forming an alliance earlier or later. This results in the following equation. 
 
 - 
(8) 
 
However, as Performance also depends on , I can also differentiate P with respect to  
  
 - (9) 
 
The total change in performance in (equation 8 and 9) can be decomposed into temporal congruent and 
contingent effects (see the body of paper for the meaning of temporal congruent and contingent 
effects). 
 
Congruent effect:  
  - (10a) 
 
Contingent effect with respect to timing of alliance formation: 
  - (10b) 
 
Contingent effect with respect to length of observation period: 
  - (10c) 
 
Proof of Proposition 1. 
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In (10a), the difference between the best and the worst outcomes is the range of outcome, and is 
positive by definition.  Given that new ventures likely accumulate more knowledge over time, then 
  As a result,  is positive. 
Proof of Proposition 2. 
Following the proof of proposition 1, it is clear that the higher  the higher   is. 
Or, for a given desired increase in performance,  multiplied by j (where j 
is some temporal delay), a higher increases j, or reduces j for a given  
 
Proof of Proposition 3. 
From equation (10b), depends on , which can range from positive 
to negative under different macro environments, as argued in the body of the paper. As the macro 
environments can take many different shapes, the following scenarios are not exhaustive. 
Scenario 1: The macro-environmental munificence decreases, such that forming an alliance later shifts 
the range of possible outcomes unfavorably, i.e.  . Equation (10b) becomes 
negative. 
Scenario 2: The macro-environmental munificence does not change, such that there is no gain or loss 
from forming an alliance later, i.e. ; . Equation (10b) becomes zero or very minimal. 
Scenario 3: The macro-environmental munificence increases, such that forming an alliance later shifts 
the range of possible outcome favorably, i.e.  . Equation (10b) becomes positive.  
Proof of Proposition 4. 
From equation (10c), depends on , which can range from positive 
to negative under different macro environments, as argued in the body of the paper. As the macro 
environments can take many different shapes, the following scenarios are not exhaustive. 
Scenario 1: The macro-environmental munificence decreases, such that increasing the observation 
period shifts the range of possible outcomes unfavorably, i.e.  . Equation (10c) 
becomes negative. 
Scenario 2: The macro-environmental munificence does not change, such that there is no gain or loss 
from increasing the observation period, i.e. ; . Equation (10c) becomes zero or very 
minimal. 
Scenario 3: The macro-environmental munificence increases, such that increasing the observation 
period shifts the range of possible outcomes favorably, i.e.  . Equation (10c) 
becomes positive.  
Proof of Proposition 5. 
To understand the overall effect, the effects from equations (10a), (10b), and (10c) have to be summed 
up. While the value of (10a) is positive, the value of (10b) and (10c) can range from positive to negative. 
Unless, (10b) and (10c) are non-negative, the overall effect can then range from positive to negative. 
Proof of Proposition 6. 
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Due to the trade-off between the effect of timing of alliance formation and the length of observation 
period under a changing macro-environmental munificence, I rely on conceptual theorizations to proof 
for Proposition 6, which is discussed in the body of the paper. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
